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 1 Introduction 
Germany1 was a founding member of the European 
Union (EU) and has traditionally been one of the most 
pro-integrationist member states. It became an envi-
ronmental pioneer on the domestic level in the 1970s 
and adopted the role of an environmental leader state 
on the international and supranational European Union 
(EU) level in the 1980s (Andersen and Liefferink, 1997; 
Jänicke and Weidner, 1997; Liefferink and Andersen, 
1998; Müller, 1986; Pehle, 1997, 1998; Weale, 1992a, 
1992b; Weale et al., 2000; Weidner, 1999; Wurzel, 
1996, 2002). In the 1970s and 1980s, Germany often 
‘uploaded’ to the EU level relatively ambitious domestic 
environmental standards and regulatory principles 
(Börzel, 2000, 2002; Hèritier et al. 1996; Knill, 2001). 
Alternatively, it took the lead by adopting nationally 
more stringent environmental policy measures where 
this was permitted by the EU Treaties (Krämer, 1990). 
German policy makers therefore saw themselves very 
much as one of the main driving forces behind EU 
environmental policy. It is therefore unsurprising that 
the impact of the Europeanisation process on member 
state environmental policies was downplayed or simply 
taken for granted by German policy makers during the 
1970s and 1980s (although there were a few dissenting 
voices as will be shown below). 
Post-unification Germany has lost some of its environ-
mental zeal. Public environmental awareness has 
moderately declined (albeit from a high level) and 
German governments have become more cost-
conscious. Since the early 1990s, Germany has come 
under pressure from the EU to reform its environmental 
regulatory style and preferred environmental standard 
setting philosophy (Albin and Müller-Kraenner, 1999; 
Friedrich et al., 2000; Héritier et al., 1996; Knill, 2001; 
Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Kraack et al., 2001; SRU, 
1998, 2002; Wurzel, 2003a, 2003b). German environ-
mental policy makers have therefore complained about 
a growing mismatch between domestic and EU prefer-
ences in the environmental policy field (see, for exam-
ple, Baacke, 2000). 
This research working paper takes a longitudinal per-
spective when assessing the impact of the Europeani-
                                                
1 The term Germany refers to the Federal Republic of 
Germany both before and after unification. 
sation process on the German environmental policy 
system which, for analytical purposes, will be disaggre-
gated into policy style, content and structures following 
Peter Hall’s (1986, 1990) influential classification. The 
analytical focus of this paper stretches from the origins of 
EU environmental policy in the early 1970s up to the re-
election of the Red-Green (SPD-Greens) coalition gov-
ernment in 2002. It therefore follows Paul Sabatier’s 
(1999) advice that (changes in) public policy should be 
studied over a period of several decades. The long term 
perspective is also justified by the fact that the effective-
ness (or ineffectiveness) of environmental policy meas-
ures frequently become clear only after a considerable 
time lag (Wurzel, 2002, 51). 
The Europeanisation process of German environmental 
policy is not a one-way process. It will be argued instead 
that it constitutes a two-way process in which both the 
‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ of styles, standards and 
structures often takes place simultaneously (see also 
Goetz and Dyson, 2003). Moreover, even environmental 
leader states will experience certain adaptation pressures 
from EU environmental policy measures because they 
are, as Albert Weale (1996, 607) has explained, ‘aggre-
gated and transformed standards of their original cham-
pions modified under the need to secure political ac-
commodation from powerful veto actors’. However, (the 
full extend of) the adaptation pressures often become 
clear only during the implementation phase. There is 
therefore often a considerable time lag because the 
implementation deadline can be considerable for some 
EU environmental policy measures (for example, the 
water framework directive (2000/60/EC) stipulates im-
plementation deadlines which exceed one decade). 
This paper starts by outlining the domestic attitudes 
towards European integration and environmental protec-
tion amongst both the political elites and the general 
public. It then puts forward a brief overview of the impact 
of the Europeanisation process on the wider German 
political system. The remainder of this paper assesses 
the Europeanisation process on the German environ-
mental policy style, content and structures while the 
conclusion summarises the main findings. 
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2 National Attitudes towards European integration 
After the Second World War, Germany adopted ‘a policy 
of self-restraint’ (Bulmer et al., 2000, 1). It strongly sup-
ported European integration in order to achieve recon-
ciliation with neighbouring countries and France in par-
ticular. Germany’s high dependence on an export driven 
industrial base after the economic miracle (Wirtschafts-
wunder) of the 1950s, made Germany a strong advo-
cate of the creation of a Single European Market (SEM). 
German Chancellors therefore had strong political and 
economic reasons for supporting a deepening of Euro-
pean integration. 
Constrained by its past, Europe’s economic giant and 
political dwarf ‘deliberately punched below its weight’ 
(Paterson, 1996, 170). Germany was reluctant to take 
on a leader role in Europe and instead became a ‘reflex-
ive multilateralist’ (Bulmer et al., 2000, 53; Hyde-Price 
and Jeffery, 2001, 690; Paterson, 2000, 32). It relied 
strongly on joint initiatives – and close cooperation with 
France in particular – to foster deeper European integra-
tion. The environmental policy field, in which the Franco-
German axis played no important role mainly due to 
different national problem perceptions and policy prefer-
ence (Hèritier et al., 1996; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 
1996), remained the most important exception to this 
tool. 
Senior state (Land) politicians have frequently ex-
pressed concern about the federal government’s readi-
ness to transfer to the EU level powers which, under the 
German constitution, fall within the competences of the 
Länder. Bavaria has been particularly outspoken in this 
regard (Hyde-Price and Jeffery, 2001; Wurzel, 2002, 
238-9). Its Prime Minister, Edmund Stoiber (CSU), 
nicknamed ‘Edmund Thatcher’ (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2 
November 1993; Die Zeit 5 November 1993), has criti-
cised the federal government and ‘Brussels’ for breach-
ing the principle of subsidiarity which has had quasi 
constitutional status in Germany long before it was 
introduced in the EU. However, Stoiber toned down his 
‘Euro-assertiveness’ (Bulmer et al., 2000, 80) when he 
acted as the Chancellor candidate for the conservative 
opposition parties (CDU/CSU) in 2002 (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 10 February 2002). De-
spite the growing ‘national interest’ rhetoric, post-
unification Germany has remained the only large mem-
ber state which fully supports both a deepening and 
widening of the EU (Bulmer et al., 2000). Euroscepti-
cism is a taboo subject within mainstream political par-
ties. It is largely confined to fringe parties. 
However, in recent years the gap between Germany’s 
political elite, which has remained broadly sympathetic 
towards deeper European integration, and the general 
public, which remained less convinced about the bene-
fits of EU membership, has widened. Public support for 
the EU in Germany (and especially the former East 
Germany) has waned and fell below the EU average at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century (CEC, 1994, 75; 
2001, 38). So far this has not led to an erosion of the 
overwhelming cross-party support for the EU and 
deeper European integration within the parliament 
(Bundestag). This has arguably allowed German gov-
ernments to take a medium to long term strategic view 
of European integration rather than having to justify 
each integrationist step on the basis of whether it fulfils 
short term national interests as is the case in more 
Euro-sceptic member states (Bulmer et al., 2000). 
Germany’s EU balance sheet is, overall, very positive, if 
one accepts that German politicians had the following 
five fundamental national objectives when agreeing to 
EU membership in the 1950s (Hrbek, 1986, 27). First, 
peace and security; second, economic reconstruction 
and recovery; third, to build up and consolidate liberal 
democracy; fourth; reunification; and fifth, restoration of 
national sovereignty. EU membership greatly facilitated 
German attempts to achieve all of these objectives. 
Considering the initial opposition from the French and 
British governments it is difficult to imagine how speedy 
unification could have taken place outside the EU 
framework. 
International relations realist theory has argued that the 
historical reasons for supporting deeper European inte-
gration in Germany will wane over time, making it a 
more ‘normal’ member state that will not shy away from 
defending its (short term) national interests. Recent 
developments seem to support this view. Gerhard 
Schröder (SPD), who, in 1998 succeeded the strongly 
pro-integrationist Helmut Kohl (CDU), is the first German 
Chancellor to be born after the Second World War. 
Schröder ‘purposefully introduced a new discourse of 
national interest into German European policy debate’ 
(Hyde-Price and Jeffery, 1991, 698) when he stated that 
"my generation and those following are European 
because we want to be not because we have to be. 
… I am sure that our European partners want to 
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have a German partner which is more calculable 
than a German partner with an inferiority complex. 
Germany standing up for its national interests will 
be just as natural as France or Britain standing up 
for theirs" (cited in Bulmer et al., 2000, 109; Hyde-
Price and Jeffery, 2001, 700). 
Schröder put his words into action when he intervened 
on behalf of the domestic automobile industry during the 
1999 German EU Presidency (Bulmer et al., 2000, 26; 
Müller, 2002; Wurzel 2000) and refused to accept the 
Commission’s warning letter regarding Germany’s 
breach of the stability pact. Moreover, he repeatedly 
accused the Commission of disregarding German inter-
ests in the run up to national elections in 2002 (Financial 
Times, 11.03.2002; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
22.03.2002). In doing this he explicitly referred to com-
petition policy and environmental policy (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 08.03.2002). However, Schröder 
also called for a deepening of European integration and 
has supported Eastern enlargement while backing down 
from his initial demands during the Agenda 2000 nego-
tiations that Germany’s budgetary contribution be re-
duced significantly before the next enlargement (Laffan, 
2000; Wurzel, 2000). At the Copenhagen summit in late 
2002, Chancellor Schröder confirmed his willingness to 
support the wider ‘European project’ by agreeing that 
Germany would have to accept a higher financial burden 
in order to ease the EU’s Eastern and Mediterranean 
enlargement. 
3 National attitudes towards the environment 
The environment policy field is one of only a few areas 
where Germany has taken on an explicit leader role 
within the EU. However, Germany took on an environ-
mental leader role within the EU and on the international 
level only in the early 1980s despite the fact that it had 
adopted a relatively ambitious domestic environmental 
programme already in the early 1970s (Andersen and 
Liefferink, 1997, Boehmer-Christiansen and Skea, 1991; 
Jänicke and Weidner, 1997; Müller, 1986; Pehle, 1998; 
Weale, 1992a, 1992b; Weale et al., 2000; Wurzel, 
2002). Germany’s new role was largely triggered by 
concerns about dying forests (Waldsterben). Scientific 
studies, which concluded that air pollutants were the 
main causes of Waldsterben, attracted huge media 
attention and considerable environmental interest group 
action thus leading to an upsurge in public environ-
mental awareness. The environment became a salient 
political issue for all mainstream political parties also 
because the Green Party entered the national parlia-
ment in 1983. Unusually for a pro-integrationist member 
state, Germany threatened to ‘go it alone’ if the EU 
refused to accept its demands for the introduction of the 
best available technology (BAT) to reduce car emissions 
(which, at the time, was the three-way catalytic con-
verter) (Arp, 1995; Boehmer-Christiansen and Weidner, 
1995; Holzinger, 1994; Weale et al. 2000, 309-407; 
Wurzel, 2002). The long drawn out car emission saga 
seemed to confirm the widely held view in Germany that 
the EU acted as a brake on domestic environmental 
policy (see Holzinger, 1994; Pehle, 1998, 239-59; 
Scharpf, 1988; SRU, 1974, 191-2). German critics of EU 
environmental policy were able to point at other exam-
ples such as the directive regulating the sulphur content 
of certain liquid fuels (75/176/EEC), the lead content in 
petrol (78/611/EEC) and the large combustion directive 
(88/609/EEC) which all constituted watered down ver-
sions of German initiatives. 
The German public has traditionally been one of the 
most environmentally aware of all member states (CEC, 
1995, 1999). However, while in 1988 there was a differ-
ence of ten percentage points between the EU and 
German averages regarding the number of people who 
thought that environmental problems were ‘an urgent 
and immediate problem’, the difference had declined to 
merely one percentage point by 1999 (CEC, 1999; 
Wurzel, 2002, 15). Since the 1990s, the environment 
has been displaced as one of the top three political 
public priorities by issues such as unemployment, wel-
fare reforms and terrorism. However, the decline in 
environmental awareness seems to have bottomed out 
since 2000 (UBA, 2001). 
In 1978, the German Environmental Expert Council 
(Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen - SRU) already 
pointed out that some EU environmental policy meas-
ures (such as certain water quality standards) were in 
fact more stringent than existing German policy (SRU, 
1978). Moreover, the SRU (1978, 514) argued that the 
EU could one day become an innovating force for Ger-
man environmental policy. However, it was only from the 
1990s onwards that German policy makers realised that 
they had underestimated the effects of the process of 
Europeanisation on the domestic environmental policy 
system (Baacke, 2000; Héritier et al., 1996; Pehle, 
1998; Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Knill, 2001; Kraack et 
al., 2001; SRU, 1998; Wurzel, 2003a, 2003b). 
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4 The Europeanisation of Germany 
Germany’s Nazi past and division into East and West 
goes a long way towards explaining why German politi-
cians initially opted for self-restraint and have often 
found it difficult to defend the national interest within the 
EU. So far, German Chancellors and Ministers have 
only rarely invoked the national veto within the EU 
(George, 1996, 82; Sturm and Pehle, 2001, 47; Wurzel, 
2000). Especially Britain and France, which have cen-
trally co-ordinated EU policies, have often expressed 
frustration at what they perceive as Germany's frequent 
inability to arrive at a clear national position prior to EU 
negotiations (Bulmer et. al, 2000; Wurzel, 2002, 61). 
However, there are also important institutional con-
straints which militate against the co-ordination of a 
coherent national EU position. Unified Germany has 
remained internally a ‘semi-sovereign state’ (Katzen-
stein, 1987), because as a federal state it is ‘a state 
without centre’ (Smith, 1992) within which ‘the power of 
state officials is both severely circumscribed and widely 
diffused’ (Katzenstein, 1987, XXIII: see also Katzen-
stein, 1997). The federal system, relatively high Ministe-
rial independence (Ressortprinzip) and coalition gov-
ernment make it difficult for any German government to 
come up with a clear national position (Wurzel, 2000, 
24). Moreover, German governments have to take into 
account the actions of powerful ‘parapolitical institutions’ 
(Katzenstein, 1987) such as the Constitutional Court 
and the Central Bank. Unsurprisingly Germany’s EU 
policy has therefore often been described as ‘sectorally 
disaggregated, weakly coordinated and, at times, highly 
disorganised’ (Hyde-Price and Jeffery, 2001, 707; see 
also Bulmer and Paterson, 1996; Demmke, 1994, 1998, 
1999; Derlien, 2000; Goetz, 1996; Paterson, 1996; 
Wurzel, 2000; 2002, 61-2; 2003a, 2003b). 
Hans-Ulrich Derlien has argued that the German ‘fire 
brigade approach … [and] its reactive style and man-
agement by exception may be well suited to the kind of 
incremental decision making in a multi-level game’ 
(Derlien, 2000, 75) such as EU policy-making. However, 
recent complaints about the alleged neglect of German 
national interests in Brussels and proposals raised 
during the 2002 election campaign by both Chancellor 
Schröder and the main opposition party’s Chancellor 
candidate, Edmund Stoiber (CSU), to create a European 
Minister within the German government suggest that 
important political actors think differently (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 8.3.2002). 
The German constitution, institutional set up and deci-
sion-making procedures are nevertheless often seen as 
particularly well adapted to the European integration 
process (Bulmer, 1986; Bulmer et al., 2000; Bulmer and 
Paterson, 1996; Derlien, 2000; Goetz, 1996; Maurer and 
Wessels, 2001). The German constitution explicitly 
allows for the transfer of national powers to suprana-
tional organisations (Article 24) while German politicians 
and officials have widely accepted pro-integrationist 
core beliefs and norms. Moreover, due to the domestic 
federal system they are familiar with multi-level political 
system within which policy-making depends to a large 
degree on consensus seeking. How can the alleged 
congruence between German and supranational multi-
level policy-making structures and fundamental goals be 
reconciled with recent domestic demands for better 
representation of German national interests in Brussels? 
One explanation is that German EU policy is ‘good on 
strategy, less good on tactics’ (Bulmer et al., 2000, 9). 
To put it differently, for historical reasons German EU 
policy has traditionally focused more strongly on me-
dium to long term goal achievement rather than on short 
term (economic) gains which is not to argue that Ger-
man negotiators failed to strike a hard bargain in EU 
negotiations. However, there are signs that German EU 
policy entered a new phase in the late 1990s during 
which short term national (economic) benefits have 
become more important as a justification for agreeing to 
EU policy measures and further integrationist steps. The 
cost of unification and sluggish economic performance 
in the 1990s has made German politicians more cost-
conscious. 
As will be discussed in more detail in section 5.3, the co-
ordination of German EU policy largely takes place 
horizontally (i.e. between different ministries) although 
the Chancellor, who determines the policy guidelines, 
occasionally intervenes. EU policy issues are discussed 
frequently in cabinet meetings although the cabinet 
committee for European affairs plays only a minor role. 
In the late 1990s, Germany streamlined its EU policy co-
ordination machinery (Bulmer et al., 2000; Derlien, 
2000; Maurer and Wessels, 2001; Wurzel, 2003a, 
2003b). However, it has not become strongly central-
ised, especially when compared to Britain and France. 
There is a burgeoning foreign policy literature which 
focuses on unified Germany's role in the new Europe. It 
portrays Germany largely as a ‘civilian’ (Maull, 1990) or 
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‘tamed’ (Katzenstein, ed., 1997) power which remains 
committed to deeper European integration (Bulmer et 
al., 2000; Garton Ash, 1994; Webber, ed., 2001) al-
though there are some dissenting voices which suggest 
that Germany will re-assess its European/foreign policy 
options (Baring, 1996; Mearsheimer, 1990). The public 
policy literature on the Europeanisation of the German 
governance system is still largely underdeveloped (see, 
for example, Goetz and Dyson, 2003; Rometsch, 1996; 
Sturm and Pehle, 2001). An important reason for this is 
that the Europeanisation of Germany was until recently 
largely taken for granted or its effects on German policy 
styles, standards and structures were down-played. 
A recent study by Roland Sturm and Heinrich Pehle 
(2001) on different institutions, decision-making proce-
dures and policy fields in Germany concludes that Euro-
peanisation has had a significant but highly variegated 
impact what they term ‘the new German governance 
system’. Out of five policy fields analysed, agriculture 
and monetary policies are seen as having been most 
affected by Europeanisation. They are closely followed 
by environmental and regional policies while justice and 
home affairs were least, although still significantly, af-
fected. The policy content of the five policy fields was 
judged overall to have been more affected than domes-
tic institutions such as the federal government, parlia-
ment and the Bundesrat or political parties. However, 
the constitutional court and interest groups as well as, 
although to a lesser degree, the Länder were all seen as 
having been strongly affected by the EU. These findings 
are broadly compatible with Hall’s view (1983, 1990) 
that the policy content changes more easily compared 
with domestic political structures and styles. 
Sturm and Pehle’s claim that certain policy fields in 
Germany (most of all economic and monetary policy, 
competition policy and agriculture policy followed by 
environmental policy and regional policy) have been 
strongly Europeanised is widely accepted. However, 
over time the EU has not only affected an increasing 
number of policy fields (such as energy policy, justice 
and home affairs and even foreign policy) but has also 
left its mark on core domestic institutional actors (such 
as the Central Bank, Constitutional Court and the 
Länder). The German policy style, which is often de-
scribed as pro-active and consensus seeking or even 
corporatist (Dyson, 1982) has also come under pressure 
from the EU as can be seen from the recent debate 
about the future of the German ‘economic model’ (Mod-
ell Deutschland). 
5 The Europeanisation of German Environmental Policy 
Until the early 1990s, the Europeanisation of German 
environmental policy attracted relatively little scholarly 
attention although there are some exceptions (for ex-
ample, Bungarten, 1978; Moltke, 1984, 1986; Krämer, 
1988; Kromarek, 1986, 1989; Weinstock, 1984). For 
much of the 1980s, Germany acted as an environmental 
leader state and was one of the main driving forces 
behind EU environmental policy. The German public 
and many domestic policy makers therefore simply 
assumed that German environmental policy was only 
marginally affected by the EU although some studies 
warned this was not actually the case for reasons which 
will become clear later when German environmental 
policy is disaggregated according to its policy style, 
content and structures. Since the 1990s, Germany has 
lost some its environmental credentials and is widely 
seen as having increasing difficulties in adapting to 
certain EU environmental policy measures. 
5.1 Policy style 
When trying to solve public policy problems, German 
governments are usually seen as having adopted a 
moderately active stance which relies heavily on con-
sensus and consultation (Dyson, 1982; Dyson, 1992; 
Jänicke and Weidner, 1997; Paterson, 2000, 37). The 
traditional German policy style, whose roots can be 
traced to the nineteenth century (Beyme, 1985), fea-
tured ‘corporatist’ elements because government con-
sultation extended mainly to employers and unions while 
environmental groups were largely excluded (Jänicke 
and Weidner, 1997; Katzenstein, 1987; Kitschelt, 1986; 
Paterson, 1989; Rose-Ackermann, 1995). 
The government’s moderately active and consensus 
seeking stance towards solving public policy problems is 
compatible with a social market economy (soziale 
Marktwirtschaft) which allows state actors to set the 
framework conditions (Ordnungspolitik) for private ac-
tors. The social market economy doctrine became 
widely accepted as a macro-political action guiding norm 
for German policy makers after the economic miracle of 
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the 1950s (Dyson, 1992). In the late 1980s there was 
wide cross-party support for developing the social mar-
ket economy further into a ‘social and ecological market 
economy’ (soziale und ökologische Marktwirtschaft) 
(Jänicke, 1993; Töpfer, 1989; Schröder, 1989). How-
ever, this move was largely abandoned in the 1990s 
when German policy makers had to come to terms with 
the economic impact of unification and an increasingly 
fierce debate about Germany’s future as a production 
and investment location within the global economy 
(Harding and Paterson, 2000). Within the ‘Standort 
Deutschland’ debate questions have been raised about 
the future of the ‘German model’ which is widely seen as 
an alternative to Anglo-Saxon capitalism (Harding and 
Paterson, 2000; Hodges and Woolcock, 1993) 
In Germany, the Commission’s recent preference (see, 
for example, CEC, 2000, 2001) for soft and self-
regulatory environmental policy instruments (such as 
procedural measures and informational devices) has 
therefore been connected to a much deeper national 
debate about the future of the ‘German model’. Some 
policy actors in Germany (such as the Economics Minis-
try) have welcomed a less interventionist approach to 
environmental policy which relies more strongly on the 
principle of ‘shared responsibility’ as outlined in the Fifth 
Environmental Action Programme (EAP). However, the 
BMU has remained largely unconvinced about the effec-
tiveness of the EU’s new ‘softer’ approach and empha-
sis on procedural measures which it fears could lead to 
a roll back of hard won domestic (and EU) achieve-
ments in the environmental policy field (interviews in 
2001). 
Klaus von Beyme (1985, 5) has warned that broad 
generalisations about ‘a national style of policy-making 
tend to obscure historical changes over time, variations 
between fields of policy and the differences between the 
role of various parties.’ This assessment holds true for 
Germany where environmental policy and EU policy 
styles have evolved over time due to indigenous domes-
tic changes and, although to a lesser degree, Europe-
anisation pressures (as well as global developments). 
However, these changes have taken place only incre-
mentally due to ‘structural’ constraints (i.e. institutional 
and constitutional constraints) as well as ‘cultural’ con-
straints (i.e. widely accepted and deeply embedded 
action guiding norms about the role of state actors within 
a social market economy and Germany’s place in 
Europe). 
In 1969, at a time when environmental awareness was 
still relatively low (SRU, 1974), a newly elected Centre-
Left government took a pro-active stance towards envi-
ronmental policy which formed part of its wider reform 
agenda (Genscher, 1980; Hartkopf and Bohne, 1983; 
Müller, 1986; SRU, 2002; Weidner, 1999). In the early 
1970s, it set up administrative capacities for dealing with 
environmental policy while adopting an ambitious na-
tional environmental programme and a wide range of 
environmental standards. The government also financed 
the setting up of environmental groups and encouraged 
extensive consultation with a wide range of actors (Hart-
kopf and Bohne, 1983). However, there was a return to 
more traditional corporatist consultation patterns after 
the first oil crisis in 1973 sent the German economy into 
recession and domestic environmental policy into a 
‘defensive phase’ (Müller, 1986). By the late 1970s, 
domestic environmental policy started to recover 
(Müller, 1986) and Germany adopted an environmental 
leader role within the EU (and on the international level) 
in 1982. However, it was only in the late 1990s that the 
government again placed more emphasis on wider 
consultation while actively trying to include environ-
mental groups (Jänicke and Weidner, 1997). 
Herbert Kitschelt’s (1986) assessment that the German 
environmental policy-making process is characterised 
by ‘closed opportunity structures’ for environmental 
groups holds true only for a particular period of time and 
is more relevant for certain sub-sectors (such as nuclear 
power) than others (for example, eco-labels) (see also 
Paterson, 1992; Rose-Ackermann, 1995; Rüdig, 2000). 
It explains why German environmental groups relied 
heavily on the courts during the ‘post-decisional phase’ 
in order to influence the environmental policy outcome 
within a political system which is characterised by a high 
degree of juridification due to a strong state law 
(Rechtsstaat) tradition. However, it fails to account for 
the fact why, unlike their British counterparts, German 
environmental groups have largely failed to lobby ‘Brus-
sels’ in order to influence (domestic and EU) environ-
mental policy. Christian Hey and Uwe Brendle (1994) 
have argued that German environmental groups hold 
strong principled beliefs and are less geared toward 
success-oriented lobbying than their British counter-
parts. Many German environmental groups have per-
ceived the EU mainly as a free trade area which acts as 
a brake on domestic environmental policy. However, 
since the 1990s, there has been a change in attitude 
and strategy towards the EU environmental policy. 
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Several German environmental groups have since 
become significantly more active on the EU level as can 
be seen, for example, from the German Nature Circle’s 
(Deutscher Naturschutzring - DNR) monthly EU circular 
(DNR, various years). This change is more a reflection 
of the fact that Germany has lost some of its environ-
mental credentials since the 1990s rather than proof for 
the continued existence of closed national opportunity 
structures. However, the EU’s access to information 
directive has granted German environmental groups 
greater access to national environmental policy informa-
tion. A Centre-Right German government initially tried to 
resist the adoption of this EU directive which has re-
mained unpopular with the administration (especially on 
the Länder level). It also refused to sign the so-called 
Aarhus Convention which granted similar access to 
environmental information rights. However, it was later 
signed by a newly elected Red-Green government. 
Germany has overall been very active on the EU level in 
the environmental policy field. However, Germany’s EU 
environmental policy style has ranged from pro-active 
(for example, car emission regulation and climate 
change) to reactive (for example, environmental impact 
assessment). Overall Germany has concentrated mainly 
on uploading domestic guiding standards and policy 
principles while neglecting both the ‘politics of staffing’ 
and the importance of presenting a coherent national 
position early on in the decision-making process (Wur-
zel, 2002, 2003a, 2003b). Germany has been very 
active in attending Commission and Council environ-
mental working groups where German officials generally 
have a reputation of high technical competence al-
though their diplomatic skills are not always valued to 
the same degree (interviews, 1998). Germany has also 
seconded to the Commission a considerable number 
national experts on issues of domestic priority (for ex-
ample, car emission regulations). However, considering 
that Germany was one of the main driving forces behind 
EU environmental policy during much of the 1970s and 
1980s, it is surprising that no German national has ever 
acted as Director-General and Deputy Director General 
within DG Environment. Only one German national has 
been appointed Commissioner in charge of DG Envi-
ronment. However, Karl-Heinz Narjes, who headed both 
DG Environment and DG Industry from 1981-85, was 
not renowned for having been an environmentally zeal-
ous Commissioner. 
The alleged under-representation of German nationals 
within DG Environment has been discussed in Germany 
on the highest political level (Wurzel, 2002, 65-6, 2003a, 
2003b; interviews 2001). The German government has 
recognised the importance of lobbying early on the 
Commission (and other member states) during the EU 
policy formulation process. However, Germany has 
often found it very difficult to adopt a clear national 
position at the start of the EU decision-making process 
due to the structural constraints which will be explained 
below. This has occasionally hampered Germany’s 
chances of influencing Commission proposals. The 
recent recalibration and centralisation of the German EU 
policy machinery is partly a reaction to these coordina-
tion problems. However, they are difficult to solve be-
cause there are limits to the degree of centralisation 
which can be imposed upon a federal state which has a 
tradition of relatively independent ministries that are 
governed by different political parties. Moreover, the 
lack of a clear national position does not always work 
against German governments in achieving their national 
aims within the EU. Pointing out that domestic constitu-
tional constraints or opposition from the Länder make it 
impossible to agree to a particular EU environmental 
policy measure or even a new Treaty provision can be a 
powerful negotiating chip. 
5.2 The Europeanisation of policy content 
Germany is a ‘high regulatory state’ (Héritier, 1996; 
Héritier et al., 1996) which has adopted a relatively 
dense body of environmental legislation (Kloepfer, 
1998). The environmental policy field fits the claim that 
German politics is characterised by a high degree of 
juridification (Dyson, 1982; Dyson, 1992; Weale, 1992b). 
Some estimates put the number of domestic environ-
mental laws at as high as 35,000 (Müller-Brandek-
Bocquet, 1996, 138) although this figure includes federal 
and Länder laws as well as relatively minor technical 
implementation laws (interview with UBA official in 
2001). Due to its strong reliance on legal rules, Ger-
many has made wide use of the EU’s information and 
standstill agreement which stipulates that the Commis-
sion should be informed about draft national environ-
mental legislation with a potential impact on the SEM in 
order to allow for the adoption of EU legislation instead 
(SRU, 1978, 512-14; Rehbinder and Stewart, 1985, 17; 
Wurzel, 2002, 75-8). However, there were also a few 
occasions when Germany failed to inform the Commis-
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sion about draft national environmental legislation under 
the standstill agreement - which was merely a gentle-
men’s agreement - because the government was con-
cerned that it might lead to a watering down of national 
standards (SRU, 1978; Wurzel, 2002, 102). 
The bulk of early EU environmental legislation dealt with 
harmonisation measures (such as car emission regula-
tions) which were designed to prevent new barriers to 
trade (Rehbinder and Stewart, 1985). Due to its rela-
tively high ecological vulnerability at the centre of 
Europe and an export driven industry, Germany had a 
strong ecological and economic interest in pushing for 
EU harmonisation measures (Grant et al., 1988, 245-65; 
Weale, 1992b; Weale et. al, 1991; Wurzel, 2002). 
However, the EU also adopted environmental laws 
which had only a tenuous link with the SEM. Moreover, 
many of these measures (such as directives on bathing 
waters (76/160/EC) and the protection of birds and their 
habitats (79/409/EEC)) had no base in German envi-
ronmental law. EU environmental laws therefore influ-
enced the content of German environmental policy from 
the 1970s onwards although initially only to a moderate 
degree because, like most member states, Germany 
found it easier to agree to ambitious EU policy meas-
ures than to implement them on the ground. However, 
from the 1980s onwards the Commission adopted a pro-
active approach to taking member states to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECJ) for failing to implement 
correctly EU environmental laws. Germany subse-
quently lost several ECJ cases (on issues such as bath-
ing water, drinking water and environmental impact 
assessment) which triggered a gradual adaptation of the 
domestic environmental policy system to suit better the 
EU environmental governance system. 
Policy goals and objectives 
Following the adoption of a relatively progressive Envi-
ronmental Programme in 1971, Germany adopted a 
wide range of major environmental laws. Early examples 
include the 1974 Water Management Act and the 1974 
Federal Ambient Air Pollution Act (Bundesimmissionss-
chutzgesetz) which has been called the ‘magna carta’ of 
German air pollution control (Genscher, 1980, 120; 
Müller, 1986). These environmental acts set the legal 
framework and outlined the general policy principles 
such as the BAT. They were followed up by detailed 
technical laws and regulations (such as the Technical 
Instructions for Air). 
German environmental policy has made wide use of 
traditional (‘command-and-control’) regulation (Ord-
nungsrecht) which stipulates emission limits at the 
source of pollution (such as the chimney of a power 
plant) and environmental quality objectives (EQOs) for a 
particular part of the environment (such as a river). 
Overall Germany has relied more heavily on emission 
limits which are often derived from the BAT principle. 
The BAT principle, which can be traced to nineteenth 
century Prussian trade ordinances (Hartkopf and Bohne, 
1983; Müller, 1986; Wey, 1982; Wurzel, 2002, 2003c), 
has led to the proliferation of detailed environmental 
laws and a focus on different environmental media (air, 
water and soil) instead of a more holistic pollution con-
trol approach (Jänicke and Weidner, 1997; Weale et al., 
1991, 2000). 
The wide use of the BAT principle in modern day Ger-
man environmental policy was encouraged by the adop-
tion of the precautionary principle (Vorsorgeprinzip) 
which legitimises pollution abatement measures even in 
the absence of scientific proof where there is a signifi-
cant risk that (irreversible) environmental damage would 
otherwise occur. However, a balance has to be struck 
between the precautionary principle and the principles of 
proportionality (Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip) and co-
operation (Kooperationsprinzip) which were all stipu-
lated in the 1971 Environmental Programme (Hartkopf 
and Bohne, 1983; Müller, 1986; Wey, 1982). The BAT 
principle is therefore open to interpretation and cost 
considerations. Some of the guiding principles of the 
1971 Environmental Programme found their way into the 
EU’s 1973 First EAP. Germany later also successfully 
uploaded the precautionary principle into the EU Treaty. 
Stringent domestic environmental measures were de-
manded by proponents of the concept of ecological 
modernisation who gained considerable support in 
Germany during the 1980s for their claim that this would 
be beneficial to both the environment and the economy 
(Jänicke, 1993; Töpfer, 1989; Schröder, 1989; Weale, 
1992a; Weale et al., 2000; Wurzel, 2002). The emer-
gence of a highly successful export oriented German 
pollution control technology industry seemed to confirm 
these claims (UBA, 1997). However, the adoption of the 
BAT principle in Germany imposed considerable short 
term economic costs on domestic industries which, for 
competitive reasons, were keen to see an uploading of 
German standards to the EU in order to achieve a level 
playing field. Many environmental NGOs also supported 
strict EU-wide emission limits in order to prevent eco-
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logical dumping and to protect the unspoilt environment. 
The ambition to export to the EU level the German 
approach to environmental policy therefore received 
considerable domestic support. 
However, member states which had adopted a different 
regulatory philosophy or attributed only a low priority to 
environmental issues were opposed to the setting of 
relatively stringent emission limits derived from the BAT 
principle. It was especially during the adoption of the 
directive on the discharge of dangerous substances into 
water (74/464/EEC) when serious Anglo-German dis-
putes erupted. German demands to adopt stringent 
emission limits was supported by most continental 
member states and especially Denmark and the Nether-
lands. However, Britain and Ireland insisted on the 
adoption of a more flexible EQO centred approach while 
arguing that their environment had a higher carrying 
capacity (Bungarten, 1978, 197-210). Because unanim-
ity was required for the adoption of EU environmental 
legislation until 1987, a compromise solution had to be 
found which allowed for a ‘parallel approach’ (i.e. emis-
sion limits or EQOs) widely seen as unsatisfactory by 
German officials (Möbs, 1991). However, occasionally 
the political deadlock could not be resolved as was the 
case for a Commission proposal regulating the pulp and 
paper industry. It was never adopted due to this particu-
lar conflict. 
The Anglo-German dispute about the best approach to 
pollution control subsided during the late 1980s. In 
1988, Germany used its EU Presidency to organise a 
ministerial seminar in Frankfurt on water policy, the 
sector where Anglo-German differences were initially 
most pronounced (Möbs, 1981, 124-6; Krämer, 1996; 
Rüdig and Krämer, 1994; Wurzel 1996, 283; 2002, 26). 
The seminar seemed to resolve some of the disputes by 
suggesting a combined approach (i.e. the adoption of 
emission limits and EQOs in an accumulative manner) 
for EU environmental policy which would reflect core 
features of the German and British (as well as other 
member states’) pollution control philosophies. How-
ever, during the long drawn out negotiations for the 
water framework directive (2000/60/EC), some of the 
earlier Anglo-German disputes resurfaced despite the 
fact that the directive formally adopted a combined 
approach (interviews with UBA officials in 2001). 
However, much to the dismay of the Netherlands, which 
is a Rhine downstream country, Germany, has not 
always been consistent in its approach to water pollution 
control in particular. In the 1970s, there were occasions 
when Germany actually sided with the British govern-
ment and watered down several EU pollution control 
measures out of fears that it would otherwise harm 
important economic interests such as the chemical 
industry which is located close to the river Rhine (Grant 
et al., 1988; Moltke, 1984; Müller, 1986). 
In the 1970s, EU environmental policy drew heavily on 
EQOs. In the 1980s, the Commission’s Directorate-
General for the Environment (DG Environment) became 
more receptive to the BAT principle. This was partly due 
to German pressure and partly out of necessity as there 
was only insufficient environmental data for adopting a 
more ambitious common environmental policy based on 
an EU-wide EQO centred approach (Wurzel, 2002, 69-
70). However, in the 1990s, the Commission returned to 
its earlier preference for an EQO-centred approach and 
moved away from a BAT derived emission limits ap-
proach as can be seen, for example, from the contro-
versial Auto-Oil I programme (Friedrich et .al., 2000). 
Since the 1990s, the Commission has placed more 
emphasis on cost-effectiveness, framework directives 
and procedural measures while the publication of pro-
posals for detailed regulations has slowed down (Her-
itier et al., 1996; Knill, 2001; Knill and Lenschow, 2000; 
Kraack et al., 2001; Liefferink, 1996; Pehle, 1997, 1998; 
Wurzel, 2003a, 2003b). This shift can be partly attrib-
uted to successful lobbying from the British government. 
However, the debate about the principle of subsidiarity, 
economic recession and the growing maturity of EU 
environmental policy are also important factors which 
led DG Environment to search for less intrusive and 
more cost-efficient policy measures (Wurzel, 2002, 68-
70). 
Some of the EU’s recent procedural measures (for 
example, on environmental impact assessment 
(85/366/EEC), freedom of access to environmental 
information (90/313/EEC), integrated pollution preven-
tion and control (96/61/EC), eco-management and audit 
systems ((1836/93/EEC)) and framework directives 
(such as the water framework directive (2000/532/EC)) 
have triggered considerable domestic adaptation pres-
sures in Germany (Héritier et al., 1996; Knill and Len-
schow, 2000; Kraack et al., 2001; Pehle, 1997, 1998; 
Wurzel, 2003a, 2003b). These adaptation pressures 
relate mainly to the domestic structures (i.e. the institu-
tional ‘fit’ or ‘misfit’) and, though to a lesser degree, the 
dominant style (i.e. the relationship between govern-
ment and societal actors) and will therefore be dis-
cussed below. 
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The EU’s recent preference for procedural environ-
mental policy measures, which have been variously 
attributed to either ‘British’ (Héritier et al., 1996; Pehle, 
1998, 235), ‘Anglo-Scandinavian’ (Baacke, 2000) or 
‘Anglo-American’ (Kloepfer, 1998, 614) influence, has 
also affected the domestic policy content. Some of these 
measures are seen as ‘alien to the German approach’ 
and considered a danger to the BAT principle because 
they rely heavily on informational rather than regulatory 
policy tools (interviews with BMU officials in 2001). 
Moreover, many of the EU’s procedural measures adopt 
an integrated pollution control approach which cuts 
across different environmental media while German 
environmental law is still largely geared towards the 
implementation of the BAT principle on a medium by 
medium basis. Largely due to unresolved disagree-
ments about environmental competences between the 
federal government and the Länder, Germany has so far 
failed to adopt a national environmental code (Umwelt-
gesetzbuch) which would have pulled together the rela-
tively specialised media centred environmental laws. 
The German government has therefore either sought to 
alter some of the procedural measures during the adop-
tion process or to divert the adaptation pressures during 
the implementation phase. In the case of the integrated 
pollution prevention and control directive, Germany used 
its EU Presidency in 1999 in order to push for the inser-
tion of the BAT principle (Wurzel, 1996, 285). The envi-
ronmental impact assessment directive was initially 
implemented in such a way that it lost much of its cross-
cutting approach. However, the German government 
had to alter its implementation legislation after it lost an 
ECJ case in 1996 (Kloepfer, 1998, 238-9). Ironically, 
Germany had been one of the pioneers in Europe when 
it adopted national legislation for environmental impact 
assessment in 1975 (Hartkopf and Bohne, 1983, 98-9; 
Kloepfer, 1998, 237-8). However, its effectiveness was 
severely curtailed due to the fact that it was only of 
secondary importance compared to more specialised 
(media centred) environmental laws (such as the Fed-
eral Ambient Air Pollution Act) which often prescribed 
the BAT. 
Policy instruments 
The EU also had an impact on the national policy in-
strument repertoire (Wurzel et al., 2003c). Traditional 
regulation is the most widely used environmental policy 
instrument in Germany. However, voluntary agreements 
(VAs) have also played an important role (UBA, 1999). 
Germany and the Netherlands have used by far the 
highest number of VAs in the EU (Jordan et al., 2003). 
German VAs are usually adopted ‘in the shadow of the 
law’ although they are legally non-binding and informal 
policy tools. Industry often tried to pre-empt government 
legislation by offering a VA instead. The use of VAs can 
be traced to the beginnings of German environmental 
policy although their importance increased significantly 
when a Centre-Right (CDU/CSU/FDP) coalition gov-
ernment adopted a coalition agreement in 1994 which 
stated a general preference for VAs above traditional 
regulatory instruments (UBA, 1999). Germany’s first 
ever Red-Green (SPD/Greens) coalition government, 
which came to power in 1998, was initially sceptical 
about VAs but later accepted their usefulness, espe-
cially for achieving Germany’s ambitious climate change 
emission reduction targets. The EU, which has made 
use of VAs only very sparingly (Mol et al, 2000; Jordan 
et al, 2001), had little impact on German VAs although 
some of them have been overwritten by EU legislation, 
as in the case of the end-of-life vehicles directive 
(2000/53/EC). 
Germany was the first country in the world to adopt a 
national eco-label in 1978. This voluntary informational 
device influenced the EU’s eco-label scheme which was 
adopted in 1992. However, EU voluntary informational 
devices such the eco-audit and management system 
were initially viewed with scepticism by the German 
government. German companies nevertheless made up 
about two-thirds of all eco-audit applications in the EU 
during the first few years of the eco-audit coming into 
effect (Knill and Lenschow, 2000; Kraack et al., 2001). 
The adoption of eco-taxes in Germany has been af-
fected by the EU both in terms of its content and timing. 
In 1999 an ecological tax reform was adopted by a Red-
Green coalition government (Reiche and Krebs, 1999). 
Its implementation had to be postponed by three months 
in order to allow for alterations which took into account 
objections raised by the Commission about exemptions 
for the manufacturing industry (interviews in 2001). The 
previous Centre-Right government had refrained from 
adopting a national eco-tax due to fears that this would 
create a competitive disadvantage for German industry. 
Instead it pushed for the adoption of an EU-wide carbon 
dioxide/energy tax (Wurzel, 1996). In 2000, the main 
opposition parties (CDU/CSU and FDP) demanded the 
abolition of the ecological tax reform but failed to gain 
the necessary majority within parliament for such a step. 
The ecological tax reform was continued after the re-
election of the Red-Green coalition government in 2002 
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although public support for this policy measure has 
remained low. 
The Commission’s proposal for an EU-wide emission 
trading system to cut climate change gases was the 
main driving force behind the German government’s 
decision to set up a national emission trading working 
group in early 2001 (Wurzel et al., 2003c). In the 1990s, 
BMU officials made three attempts to set up small-scale 
pilot schemes. However, these efforts came to no avail 
due to industry opposition (interview in 2001). Ger-
many’s chemical industry in particular is opposed to 
tradable permits and instead favours VAs as ‘tried-and-
tested instruments’ (interviews, 2001). Germany did not 
belong to the environmental pioneers (such as Den-
mark, Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden) which set 
up national emission trading schemes at an early stage 
in order both to gain practical experience and/or to offer 
a model for the EU scheme. On the contrary, Germany 
delayed the EU decision-making process on the Council 
level when it asked the Danish Presidency to postpone 
the negotiations within the Environmental Council by 
several months (interview, 2002). 
The influence of the EU on policy instruments in Ger-
many has been a highly variegated one. In the 1970s 
and 1980s both German and EU environmental policy 
relied heavily on regulation. The EU’s emphasis on 
regulation was at least partly a result of Germany’s 
successful attempts to upload national environmental 
legislation to the EU level. The Commission’s recent 
emphasis on procedural measures has led to a partial 
misfit between German and EU approaches (Hèritier et 
al., 1996; Knill, 2001; Knill and Lenschow, 1998; 2000; 
Pehle, 1997, 1998). 
Policy standards 
The EU has acted both as a ‘brake and a facilitator 
(Bremser and Förderer)’ for national environmental 
standards (Hartkopf and Bohne, 1983, 169). Broadly 
speaking, the Europeanisation of German environmental 
standards can be grouped into three major categories. 
First, relatively progressive German (draft) standards 
which were uploaded to the EU level. Examples include 
the waste oils directive (75/439/EEC), the sulphur con-
tent of certain liquid fuels directive (75/716/EEC), the 
lead in petrol directive (78/611/EEC), the large combus-
tion directive and many car emission directives (Hart-
kopf and Bohne, 1983, 169; Moltke, 1984, 312). How-
ever, usually German standards and/or demands were 
adopted by the EU only after a certain time lag (which, 
in the case of the large combustion directive and the 
introduction of the three-way catalytic converter, 
amounted to almost ten years). Moreover the uploaded 
standards were often subject to modifications which took 
into account the core demands of EU veto actors such 
as member governments that acted as environmental 
laggards (Arp, 1995; Holzinger, 1994; Weale, 1996; 
Wurzel, 2002). Often this brought about a dilution of the 
original German standards/demands as many EU envi-
ronmental laws stipulate exemptions, derogations, 
phased in deadlines and vague compromises which are 
open to different (national) interpretations. However, the 
final EU legislation also often contained additional re-
quirements which went beyond the original German 
demands because other environmental leader states 
and the environmentally minded EP tried further to 
tighten the standards during the EU adoption process. 
There are therefore very few, if any, EU environmental 
laws which are solely based on German (draft) legisla-
tion (Wurzel, 2002, 2003a, 2003b). This explains why 
the implementation of uploaded standards has not al-
ways been without problems. 
Second, EU standards which were downloaded to the 
national level. Examples include legally binding stan-
dards for bathing waters (directive 76/160/EEC), stan-
dards against water pollution caused by nitrates from 
agricultural sources (directive 91/676/EEC) and conser-
vation measures for wild birds (79/409/EEC). Overall the 
implementation of downloaded standards has caused 
greater implementation problems on the national level in 
comparison to uploaded standards. This was the case 
especially for downloaded standards which required 
procedural and institutional changes during the imple-
mentation process thus generating adaptation pressures 
on preferred policy styles and traditional national struc-
tures. 
Third, there is an intermediate category which sub-
sumes those EU policy measures that the BMU (and its 
allies) would have liked to adopt on the national level but 
failed to do so due to the resistance of powerful national 
veto actors such as the Economics Ministry, the Agricul-
tural Ministry and the Chancellor. Examples include 
certain EU environmental laws on dangerous chemicals, 
nature protection laws (for wild birds and their habitats) 
and the end-of-life vehicles directive (2000/53/EC) (see 
also Hartkopf and Bohne, 1983, 169). However, the 
BMU's domestic opponents also make use of the EU 
decision-making arena as can be seen from the follow-
ing statement by an Economics Ministry official (cited in 
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Wurzel, 2002, 11): ‘Brussels is often our last hope when 
it comes to toning down some of the extreme measures 
put forward by the BMU.’ 
During the 1970s and especially the 1980s, Germany 
was very successful in uploading guiding principles, 
policy instruments and domestic standards to the EU 
level. However, since the 1990s there has been ‘a grow-
ing mismatch between EU and German environmental 
policy preferences’ (interview with BMU official in 1999). 
The adoption of recent procedural measures in particu-
lar has placed considerable pressure on domestic (envi-
ronmental policy and EU policy) structures to which we 
now turn. 
5.3 Policy structures 
The core institutional structures of the German environ-
mental policy system were set up by a Centre-Left 
(SPD/FDP) coalition government for which environ-
mental policy formed part of a wider reform agenda 
when it came to power in 1969 (Bechmann, 1984; Gen-
scher, 1980; Hartkopf and Bohne, 1983; Jänicke and 
Weidner, 1997; Müller, 1986; Pehle, 1998; Weidner, 
1999; Wey, 1982). The Centre-Left government created 
special administrative capacities for dealing with envi-
ronmental problems, adopted an ambitious environ-
mental programme, introduced new policy instruments 
(including market instruments such as the 1976 waste 
water levy and the 1978 eco-label) and experimented 
with novel procedural approaches (such as integrated 
pollution control). However, when the reform euphoria of 
the late 1960s and early 1970s came to an abrupt end 
due to the oil crisis in 1973, German environmental 
policy entered a ‘defensive phase’ (Müller, 1986). Ger-
man environmental policy subsequently again relied 
more heavily on traditional approaches and instruments. 
Moreover, in the early 1980s the (environmental) re-
formers of the 1970s discovered a significant implemen-
tation gap on the domestic level (Mayntz, 1980, 1983). 
The above mentioned implementation gap with regard to 
EU environmental policy is therefore not unique; there 
was also an implementation gap with regard to national 
environmental policy measures. 
The institutional structures which were set up to deal 
with environmental policy during the early 1970s have 
remained remarkably stable despite the fact that a sepa-
rate Environmental Ministry (BMU) was set up in 1986. 
The BMU took over the environmental competences of 
the Interior Ministry (BMI) which had been the lead 
department for environmental policy since 1969. The 
BMI was made up mainly of legally trained officials who 
felt most comfortable with traditional regulation (inter-
view in 2001). This partly explains why market instru-
ments became more important only after the BMU was 
set up. The BMI/BMU receives scientific advice from the 
Federal Environmental Agency (Umweltbundesamt - 
UBA) which is a relatively large agency. The UBA was 
set up in 1974 and quickly developed into an important 
actor in German and EU environmental policy due to its 
technical expertise. The Environmental Expert Council 
(Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen - SRU), which 
was modelled on the American Council of Environ-
mental Experts, has provided independent advice since 
1972. Environmental Ministries also exist on the Länder 
level which explains why the BMU is relatively small. 
The German debate about domestic environmental 
policy structures has focused primarily on three aspects 
(Müller, 1986, 2002; Pehle, 1998; Weale et al., 2000, 
203-4). First, whether there should be an independent 
Environmental Ministry or whether environmental policy 
can be conducted more effectively by a classic Ministry 
with more extensive staff and power resources such as 
the Interior Ministry. Second, whether institutional struc-
tures that are largely geared towards the implementation 
of the BAT principle for a particular environmental me-
dium can take sufficient account of cross-media inte-
grated pollution control. Third, whether the EU’s efforts 
to integrate environmental requirements into other policy 
sectors (so-called Cardiff process), which re-opened the 
national debate that had taken place the 1970s about 
the best inter-departmental co-ordination mechanisms 
(Hartkopf and Bohne, 1983, 144-50), requires significant 
adaptation to be made to the administrative structure. 
Over time the institutional structures and procedures on 
the federal level were adapted incrementally in order to 
cope with the EU’s increasing involvement in environ-
mental policy. A small EU coordination unit was set up 
in the BMU during the 1980s. However, its ability to 
coordinate the German input into the Environmental 
Council is limited because most of the EU business - 
apart from coordination of the German EU Presidency - 
is left to technical units which act relatively independ-
ently. This confirms the view that the BMU perceives EU 
environmental policy ‘mainly as interior environmental 
policy (Umweltinnenpolitik) rather as foreign environ-
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mental policy (Umweltaussenpolitik)’ (interview with 
BMU official in 1992; see also Genscher, 1980; Hartkopf 
and Bohne, 1983). 
Within the federal government the BMU is ‘one of the 
most Europeanised Ministries’ with EU dossiers amount-
ing to about ‘90 per cent’ of some units’ work (interview 
with BMU official in 1992). However, it is difficult to 
gauge whether the BMU has overall been strengthened 
or weakened by Europeanisation. On the one hand, the 
BMU has been strengthened (vis-à-vis other federal 
Ministries as well as the Länder) because it is usually 
the lead department for all EU dossiers which are nego-
tiated within the Environmental Council. Moreover, as 
was pointed out earlier, the BMU was able to upload to 
the EU level certain policy problems for which no resolu-
tion could be found on the domestic level. However, this 
must be contrasted with a survey by Heinrich Pehle 
(1998, 248) which found that 42 per cent of BMU offi-
cials think the EU environmental policy hinders German 
environmental policy. 
EU policy co-ordination on the federal 
level and in Brussels 
German EU policy is co-ordinated according to a two-
track system: a policy specialist track and a diplomatic 
track (Derlien, 2000). Its main features have changed 
only incrementally since the 1950s. Overall the expert 
track has become more important, resulting in an in-
creased number of direct contacts between German and 
EU desk officials as well as German officials and offi-
cials from other member states. Wolfgang Wessels 
(1992, 1997) has therefore identified ‘an ever closer 
fusion’ between member state and supranational ad-
ministrations. Within technical (‘low politics’) sectors 
(such as the environment), it is usually the respective 
functional ministry that acts as lead department. One 
exception in the environmental field is sustainable de-
velopment for which the Chancellery has taken on the 
overall co-ordination role on the domestic level although 
the BMU co-ordinates Germany’s sustainable develop-
ment strategy on the EU and international level (inter-
views in 2001 and 2002). The Chancellor and Foreign 
Minister usually take charge of ‘high politics’ issues such 
as Treaty amendments which are negotiated by Inter-
governmental Conferences (IGCs). Up until the Maas-
tricht Treaty, the BMI/BMU has been relatively success-
ful in getting its proposed Treaty amendments accepted 
as German positions. This is partly due to the high level 
of public environmental awareness in Germany which 
makes it difficult for the Chancellor to ignore the BMU 
during IGCs that usually attract a lot of media attention. 
Moreover, ministries (such as the Economics Ministry) 
which are often opposed to the BMU on the domestic 
level, perceive the EU-wide adoption of ‘German’ envi-
ronmental standards and policy principles as the lesser 
‘evil’ compared to a unilateral adoption of these stan-
dards and principles. 
Until recently, the Economics Ministry took on a post-
master role for all EU dossiers to and from Brussels. It 
also had some residual co-ordination powers with re-
gard to German EU policies. However, following the 
election of a Red-Green (SPD-Greens) government in 
1998, the BMWi's influential European division was 
moved to the Finance Ministry. This has resulted in a 
shift towards a more streamlined and cost-conscious 
approach to EU policy-making (Bulmer et al., 2000, 25). 
However, after the re-election of the Red-Green coali-
tion government in 2002, the European division was 
transferred back into the Economics Ministry which was 
merged with Labour Ministry. 
The Economics Ministry and the Foreign Office are well 
represented in terms of staff in the Brussels-based 
German Permanent Representation, which is made up 
of approximately 100 senior civil servants. The same 
cannot be said for the BMU which has only had its own 
official(s) within the Permanent Representation since 
1993. Until then, EU environmental policy issues (includ-
ing Presidency business) were very much ‘run from 
Bonn’ (interview in 1991). Since the mid-1990s, three 
BMU officials are based within the Permanent Repre-
sentation (Demmke and Unfried, 2001; Wurzel, 1995; 
interviews, 2002). 
Germany’s EU policy is co-ordinated by ministerial 
officials in Bonn/Berlin although Permanent Representa-
tion officials are closely involved in this process. The 
Permanent Representation acts mainly as the interface 
between Brussels and Bonn/Berlin although for some 
dossiers it has been given considerable freedom of 
manoeuvre to allow it to exploit its intimate knowledge of 
the latest twists and turns in the often fast moving EU 
negotiations. 
In 2000 a change of Germany’s EU policy co-ordination 
mechanism took place. It was partly triggered by the 
political damage caused by Chancellor Schröder’s last 
minute intervention with regard to the end-of-life vehi-
cles directive. However, calls for more effective co-
ordination and better representation of German objec-
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tives in Brussels had already been mounting prior to this 
episode (Derlien, 2000; interviews, 2001). 
In Autumn 2000, a three stages procedure has been 
introduced in order to ensure better co-ordination of 
German EU policy (interviews in 2001). In the first stage, 
the heads of the European units (or their deputies) in the 
various Ministries (Europabeauftragte) meet approxi-
mately once a week. The Foreign Ministry chairs the 
(‘high politics’) COREPER II issues while the Finance 
Ministry chairs the (‘low politics’) COREPER I issues. In 
the second stage, the heads of the European divisions 
(Europaabteilungsleiter) or their deputies meet approxi-
mately every two weeks. In the third stage, the Junior 
Ministers for Europe (Staatssekretäre) meet about once 
a month while aiming to resolve the remaining co-
ordination problems and to agree on medium term stra-
tegic aims. However, according to one official, ‘medium 
term means anything within the next few weeks’ (inter-
view in 2001). 
An embarrassing episode involving the end-of-life vehi-
cles directive was one of the reasons why these altera-
tions were made to the German EU policy coordination 
machinery (interview in 2001). During the 1999 German 
EU Presidency, Chancellor Schröder instructed his 
Environmental Minister, Jürgen Trittin (Greens), who 
favoured the proposed measure, to keep the end-of-life 
vehicles dossier off the Environmental Council’s agenda 
for fear that Germany might be outvoted (Müller, 2002; 
SRU, 2002: Wurzel, 2000, 2001). Trittin had already 
agreed in principle to the end-of-life vehicles directive 
under the 1998 Austrian Presidency. However, frantic 
lobbying by the automobile industry, which was con-
cerned about the cost implications of the proposed 
directive, alerted the Chancellor to the proposal. He 
subsequently overruled Trittin and persuaded - at a very 
late stage in the EU adoption process - the British and 
Spanish Prime Ministers to put pressure on their Envi-
ronmental Ministers in order to help Germany form a 
blocking minority within the Environmental Council 
(Wurzel, 2000, 2001). This constituted a rare abuse by a 
German government of the office of the Presidency 
which is supposed to act as an honest broker (see 
Wurzel, 1996, 2000). 
In 2002, another unresolved conflict between the Envi-
ronmental Minister Trittin and Chancellor Schröder 
threatened to endanger Germany’s EU negotiation 
strategy with regard to the Commission’s proposal for a 
directive on an EU-wide emission trading scheme in 
order to reduce climate change gases. Trittin favoured 
the adoption of a tradable permit scheme while 
Schröder has remained sceptical. However, in this case, 
Germany’s ‘early warning’ system (which relied heavily 
on information gathering from the Permanent Represen-
tation) functioned. Germany put the Danish EU Presi-
dency under pressure to postpone a vote on the pro-
posal within the Environmental Council by several 
months in order to thrash out a number of (domestic and 
EU) disagreements (interviews, 2002). 
Co-ordination may also be difficult because German EU 
delegations sometimes reach the size of football teams, 
depending on the allocation of domestic competences 
(Wurzel, 2002, 61). There have been several occasions 
when German delegations have spoken with different 
voices. One of the most spectacular examples took 
place during the Commission’s launch of the Auto-Oil II 
Programme in 1997. The Commission’s aim was to 
complete the Auto-Oil I Programme by arriving at cost-
effective car emission and fuel standards derived from 
ambient urban air quality (Friedrich et al., 2000). The 
BMU official who was heading the German delegation 
strongly condemned the Commission’s approach and 
walked out of the meeting, threatening a German boy-
cott. At the same time, one of his colleagues from the 
Economics Ministry actually praised the Commission’s 
approach (Wurzel, 2002, 160). 
The Federal system 
Germany has a long federal tradition. In the environ-
mental policy field the Länder have tried to guard their 
constitutional competences by insisting on the applica-
tion of the principle of subsidiarity vis-à-vis the federal 
government and the EU (Bohne, 1992). In the 1970s, 
the Länder successfully defended their national compe-
tences for water management and nature protection by 
blocking a constitutional amendment which would have 
given the federal government powers similar to those 
which it had acquired for air pollution, waste manage-
ment and noise pollution control. As a consequence, 
environmental policy competences have remained 
asymmetrical between the Länder and federal govern-
ment which helps to explain why Germany has difficul-
ties in adopting a cross-media approach. 
Prior to the 1987 Single European Act (SEA), which 
introduced explicit environmental provisions into the EC 
Treaty, the Länder frequently claimed that the EU had 
only insufficient Treaty competences for dealing with 
environmental issues (Bungarten, 1978; interviews in 
1992 and 2001). However, the federal government, 
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which holds the foreign policy competences, often ig-
nored the opposition of the Länder which accused the 
government of seeking to extend its competences by 
agreeing to EU environmental legislation. This has often 
led to a lack of co-operation by the Länder during the 
implementation phase, especially on EU environmental 
policy measures (such as water legislation and nature 
protection laws) which fall within their competences on 
the domestic level. Implementation of EU environmental 
laws is generally more complex and often more time 
consuming in federal states compared to centralised 
states. However, the ECJ has not accepted as legiti-
mate difficulties with internal domestic structures as an 
excuse for late or incorrect implementation of EU envi-
ronmental laws. 
It is the federal government which will be taken to the 
ECJ if the Länder fail correctly to implement EU envi-
ronmental laws. Up until the Amsterdam Treaty, which 
introduced the possibility of fines for member states 
failing to implement ECJ decisions, the federal govern-
ment could do little apart from putting political pressure 
on the Länder by, for example, pointing out that Ger-
many’s reputation as an environmental leader state and 
‘good European’ member state was at stake. However, 
since then it has threatened to pass on to the Länder 
any fines imposed at member state level for failure to 
comply with ECJ judgements. The Commission’s insis-
tence on the correct implementation of EU environ-
mental legislation has even lead to unfounded accusa-
tions that it wants to set up an ‘occupational regime’ 
(Besatzungsregime) (Salzwedel, 1989, 49). 
The Maastricht Treaty had to be ratified by parliament 
(Bundestag) and the Bundesrat (ie. the ‘upper house’ 
where the Länder are represented). The Länder used 
this opportunity to insist on closer involvement in EU 
policy-making (including environmental policy-making). 
In 1992, this triggered a constitutional amendment (Arti-
cle 23) which obliges the federal government to keep 
the Länder better informed. Moreover, they have been 
granted the right to represent Germany in the Council on 
issues which fall within the exclusive Länder compe-
tences on the domestic level (Bundesrat, 2001; Dem-
mke and Unfried, 2001; Maurer and Wessels, 2001). 
In 2001, the Länder had 308 representatives for 80 
Council and 127 Commission working groups (Bundes-
rat, 2001, 13). Initially the Länder representatives were 
allocated one or several legislative proposal(s). How-
ever, Länder representatives are now allocated accord-
ing to certain themes as the old system turned out to be 
inefficient. The Länder are also represented in the 
Committee of Regions which, however, has failed to 
become an influential player on the EU level. Moreover, 
the Länder now all have their own (or joint) offices in 
Brussels and occasionally compete for access to EU 
institutions with the federal government. Since the 
1990s, the Länder have become more competent on 
European matters (europafähig) and developed a more 
proactive approach towards European integration. 
Unlike the national parliament (Bundestag), which has 
been one of the losers of the Europeanisation of Ger-
man environmental policy, the Länder have managed to 
claw back some of the competences from the national 
executive. 
6 Conclusion 
The EU has acted both as a brake and facilitator for 
German environmental policy (Hartkopf and Bohne, 
1983, 169). Germany is a high regulatory state with a 
relatively dense body of environmental laws. Moreover, 
it has acted as an environmental leader state during 
much of the 1980s. The EU’s impact on the environ-
mental policy content was therefore initially relatively 
limited. However, since the early1990s, Germany’s 
record has become a mixed one. It remains an environ-
mental leader state on issues such as car emission 
regulations and climate change but has fallen behind on 
procedural issues such as access to environmental 
information and environmental impact assessment. The 
EU’s impact has therefore grown accordingly although 
this is least pronounced with regard to substantive tech-
nical standards and most significant with regard to pro-
cedural measures. The EU has introduced a limited 
number of new policy principles (such as the principle of 
shared responsibility) to the German environmental 
policy discourse while helping to raise the importance of 
others (such as sustainable development). However, 
there is disagreement among policy makers in Germany 
about whether these new principles will lead to a more 
progressive environmental policy. The BMU and UBA 
are concerned that some of the procedural measures 
put forward by the Commission in the 1990s may lead to 
a weakening of German standards and well established 
policy principles such as the BAT. Overall the Europe-
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anisation process has affected the policy content to a 
much larger degree than the national structures and 
style. 
The impact of the EU on domestic structures is most 
evident with regard to the federal system with the 
Länder insisting on a constitutional amendment that 
grants them the right to be better informed and more 
closely involved in EU decision-making. However, ten-
sions remain between the federal government and the 
Länder which are concerned about an erosion of their 
constitutional powers in favour of the national executive 
and ‘Brussels’. Since the late 1990s there has been a 
moderate centralisation of the German EU policy co-
ordination machinery in order to ensure better represen-
tation of German interests and to avoid a repeat of the 
end-of-life vehicles directive episode which damaged 
both Germany’s reputation as a pro-integrationist mem-
ber state and its reputation as an environmental leader 
state. Over time the BMU has managed to increase its 
presence in the German Permanent Representation in 
Brussels and the Commission as well as Council envi-
ronmental working groups which is a reflection of the 
growing importance of the EU for German environ-
mental policy. 
Up to the late 1980s, Germany was relatively successful 
in uploading to the EU level some of its environmental 
regulatory principles, policy instruments and standards 
(Héritier et al., 1996; Héritier, 1996; Sbargia, 1996; 
Vogel, 1995). During this period of time German envi-
ronmental policy was only moderately affected by Euro-
peanisation which was therefore largely taken for 
granted. Since the early 1990s, German and EU envi-
ronmental policy have begun to diverge. The resulting 
partial mismatch has caused considerable friction and 
forced Germany to readjust the workings of its environ-
mental (and EU) policy structures while also influencing 
the national policy style. 
Up to now, the ‘national’ policy style has arguably been 
least affected by the EU. However, there are signs that 
this may be about to change. Overall the German envi-
ronmental policy style has remained moderately pro-
active with a strong emphasis on consensus and consul-
tation. Environmental groups have gained greater ac-
cess to information due to the EU but largely failed to 
lobby ‘Brussels’ for their aims until the 1990s. The EU’s 
emphasis on procedural measures and self-regulation 
poses a challenge to the more formalistic German envi-
ronmental policy style that relies heavily on detailed 
substantive regulation. The BMU and UBA have raised 
concerns that some of the procedural measures 
adopted on the EU level could lead to a weakening of 
German environmental policy. 
However, the partial mismatch between national and EU 
policy style should not be exaggerated. Overall the 
Europeanisation of German environmental policy has 
been an incremental and relatively subtle process that 
initially attracted relatively little scholarly attention until 
recently. The realisation of the partial mismatch between 
domestic and EU preferences and approaches in the 
1990s has, however, been a relatively sudden one. It 
has contributed towards the recalibration of the German 
EU policy that the government undertook to ensure the 
better representation of German national interests. 
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